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Recent en1phasis on uncertainty in environmental decision Inaking reflects 
numerous changes in environmental science and policy making over the past few 
decades. Firstly, environmental policy problem_s increasingly involve large, intercon-
nected and cOInplcx social choices. For example, climate change, ozone depletion, 
biodiversity loss, genetically-engineered crops, enviromnent-related diseases and 
health risks involve large scale, long-term impacts, whose precise causes and con-
sequences are often poorly understood. Given these uncertainties and the risk of 
irreversible environnlental changes, different perspectives about the nature, policy 
implications, or even the existence of a problem, are inevitable (Rittel and Webber, 
1973; Sarewitz, 2004). 
Secondly, as a consequence, environmental policies have shifted to more pre-
cautionary (Tallacchini, 2005; van Asselt and Vos, 2005), non-structural (Faisal et 
aI., 1999; Lu et al .. 2001b) and demand-led approaches (Mohamed and Savenije, 
2000). 
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Thirdly, and also as a consequence of these new cllvirOlllllental problclllS, the 
process of policy nuking has increasingly favoured interdisciplinary, pluralistic and 
inclusive methodologies (Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2(04), with scientists participating 
alongside other stakeholders in deliberative decision making (Renn, 2(06), partic-
ipatory assessment (Argent and Grayson, 20(3) or group 1110del building (Vcnnix, 
1999) . 
These transforl1lations arc intertwined \vith a changing relationship between 
science and society, favouring greater opcnnes~ and a dialogue bct"\veen all knowl-
edgeable parties (Fairhead and Seoones, 200S), otten laying emphasis on multiple 
l11Cthods and perspectives in tackling these problems. 
In this context, 'uncertainty' has becOIne increasingly illlportant in environtncn-
tal science and policy making. One reason is that policy outcomes are only partly 
predictable and their associated uncertainties are large enough to sustain persistent 
conflicts and indecision. Related to this is thc occasional tendency for scientists to 
conceal uncertainty for fear of diminishing their professional credibility and en-
couraging indecision (Bradshaw and Borchers, 2000). It is also because uncertainty 
provides a political resource, which can sustain personal beliefs and self-interest 
(Stirling, 21J06; Weiss, 2002). Uncertainty poses various philosophical challenges 
regarding the origin, nature and value of knowledge, ethical challenges regarding 
acceptable levels of knowledge and risk, its distribution, and who has the nun date 
to decide, and political challenges regarding ho\v to act when faced with substantial 
uncertainty. It also poses several practical challenges, in terms of identifying and de-
scribing (quantifying, qualifying) uncertainties, propagating them through decisions 
and cornnlUnicating the results of an uncertainty analysis. 
Recent clnphasis on uncertainty within science has led to nl3llY perspectives on 
ho\v risk and uncertainty should be defined and tackled (see for a review Brown, 
2004; Brown et aI., 2005; Refsgaard ct aI., 2005; Rotmans and van Asselt, 2001 a; 
Rotmans and van Asselt, 2001b; van der Sluijs, 2007; Walker et aI., 20(3). Indeed, 
there is little consensus on how uncertainty should be defined, and no consistent, 
interdisciplinary framework in which to address it (although some attempt,> have 
been nude, such as Walker et a1., 2(03). This reflects the complex nature of uncer-
tainty and the diversity of disciplines in which it is a topic of re,>earch. 
Harmonising these different concepts is not sinlply an issue of accepting termi-
nology, but an issue of exploring the diversity of words and meanings associated 
with uncertainty as an "unlbrella concept" (e.g. including tefIns such as imperfect, 
indeternlinate, indecisive, ambiguous, inlprecise, inaccurate, vague and ignorant). 
The differences between cOlTIpeting understandings of uncertainty (e.g. as a fea-
ture of real world SystClllS versus a state of mind or SOIne conlbination of thc two) 
are deeply rooted in the lncthodological contexts in which uncertainty is conceptu-
alised and debated. For example, whilc lluthenuticians agree on the basic principles 
of conditional probability, they may disagree on the range of applications in which 
Bayes' rule (of conditional probabilities) is appropriate, due to important philosoph-
ical differences on thc nature of probability. In the context of this paper, the lack of 
a coherent understanding of uncertainty is only significant as far as it frustrates sci-
entiftc policy advice. Indeed, in scientiftc research, the variety of cOlllpetillg views 
and interpretations of uncertainty (and scientiftc concepts in general) is favourable in 
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the long tern I for encouraging debate and advancing knowledge. Policy-related re-
search on the other hand is action-oriented and cOlnpeting scientific interpretations 
prevent shared comnlitments and make scientific testinlony increasingly politicised 
(Sarewitz, 2004; Weiss, 2002). 
In this chapter we discuss the role and value of uncertainty in environmental 
decision making, infonned and aided by science. The paper is complernentary to 
the discussion in Maier et a1. (Chapter 5), focusing on uncertainties in scientific 
simulation rnodels; and Brugnach et a1. (Chapter 4), which describes various uses 
of models and associated uncertainties. For this reason, a detailed discussion of un-
certainty in scientific models is avoided here. In Section 6.3, we briefly discuss 
cognitive biases and heuristics which influence perceptions of uncertainty. The link 
between a perceived level of uncertainty or confidence and a number of wider sit-
uational and personal factors is illustrated. In Section 6.4, we focus on uncertainties 
in decision models and decision frameworks, including their normative assump-
tions and ability to reduce judgemental biases. We argue that the large nunlber of 
alternative franleworks can create confusion and encourage indecision, rather than 
reducing it, if the lllethodological diversity is not tackled sensibly. We show that per-
ceptions and assessments of uncertainty are dependent on the fonnulation of policy 
problenls and the extent to which a decision framework is embraced by policy 
lnakers. Finally, we provide several exalnples in which the problems of uncertainty 
in decision franleworks have been reduced through creative policy formulation -
allowing resolution of hitherto intractable problems. 
6.2. FACTORS INFLUENCING PERCEPTIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
There is a vast body of literature in cognitive sciences, experimental psy-
chology and behavioural decision theory dedicated to the study of inconsistencies 
underlying judgelnent and choice. Probably the best known are fralning effects 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which refer to changing preferences in nonna-
tively equivalent situations. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974) a decision 
fraIlle refers to a "decision lnaker's conception of acts, outcoIlles, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice." In a strict sense, the definition is applied to sit-
uations in which the presentation of a problem is slightly manipulated (e.g. half fun 
versus half elnpty) but the prospects remain unchanged. In a loose sense the franling 
effects go beyond a simple semantic manipulation and include substantially different 
fonnulations of the 'saIne' problenl (such as positive/gain vs. negative/loss frames), 
where 'same' is defined in the context of econOlnic theory (Kuhberger, 1998). De-
scribing identical problems in different frames can elicit different preferences: by 
highlighting the positive aspects of a problem, risk-aversion is encouraged; whereas 
negative fraIlling encourages risk-seeking. Others suggest a typology of franting 
effects with different undedying lnechanisnls and consequences, distinguishing be-
tween risky choice, goal and attribute fralning (Levin et al., 1998). 
Tvcrsky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman and Tvcrsky (1996) suggest 
that intuitive judgernent is nlediated by a nunlber of distinctive mental operations, 
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called judgclnental heuristics. Although practical, these heuristics lead to errors and 
inconsistencies in judgell1ents. Their study is practically Illotivated (to recognise 
limitations of intuitive choices) and helps to understand psychological processes un-
derlying perceptioll and judgement. An availability heuristic, for cXJlnple, refers to 
the positive weighting of an event that can be easily renlelnhered (Alexander, 2002; 
Greening et aI., 1996; Kahneman and Tvcrsky, 1(96). People tend to base their 
probabilistic asseSSlllcnts on the number of instances they can recall. Judgements 
are not '!imply retrieved fronl luell10ry but are derived fronl a process that in-
volves recalling 11lCl1l0rable information (Carroll, 1978). Base-rate neglect reflects 
the tendency of people to base intuitive predictions and judgements of probability 
on sinlilarity or representatives rather than explicitly-stated base rates of outconles. 
Conjunction fallacy (see e.g. Fantino, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982) refers 
to the tendency of people to rate the probability of two events lnore likely to oc-
cur than one of them alone. Confirmation bias (Fiedler, 2000; Jonas et al., 2(01) 
refers to selective information processing, favouring information \vhich confirms 
rather than contradicts the belief and leads to all but one or two of the Inost im-
portant aspects to be disregarded. Overconfidence (Brenner and Koehler, 1996; 
Tversky and Kahnenun, 1974) refers to the underestilllJtion of uncertainties in 
some areas compared to the 'average response' whereas underconfidence refers to 
the exaggeration of SOllIe uncertainties. A good overview of these and other bi-
ases and heuristics can be found in Berthoz (2004) and Kahneman et al. (1982). 
Interestingly, despite a rich literature on expert elicitation of probabilities and risks 
(e.g. Ayyub, 2001; Moorthy and Fiel1er, 1998), few studies have attempted to inte-
grate the social-psychological aspects of expert elicitation with the statistical aspects 
of defining uncertainty, although nUInerous researchers acknowledge this problem 
(see Moorthy and Fie1ler, 1998). 
Opinions on risk and uncertainty arc also associated with an individual's char-
acter and personality (Larichev, 1992; Lu et al., 2001a). Different cognitive styles 
have been employed to explain these phenomena (Blais et al., 20(5), employing 
different Ineasures of cognitive style, such as: the need for enjoyable and challeng-
ing cognitive activities; the need to iInpose structure to dispel doubt and uncer-
tainty; fear of invalidity, information gathering (perception styles) and inforlllJ-
tion evaluation Gudgenlent styles). Numerous researchers (Nicholson et aI., 2005; 
SinIan et aI., 2(00) have found a positlve association between risk behaviour and a 
number of distinctive personal characteristics. 
Differences in opinion or 'biases' on risk and uncertainty vary systeInatically 
between groups of scientists and policy makers, as well as between individuals. For 
example, scientists tend to overestinlate the uncertainties associated with research 
from competing groups. An inability to listen carefully or a lack of critical inves-
tigation, including its deliberate suppression, Inay decrease group perfonnance and 
conviction. Janis (1972) identified several sylnptOIns or biases appllcable to group 
performance (Turner Jnd Pratkanis, 1998). These symptOIns are especially appar-
ent in highly cohesive, isohted groups with a dominant leader. In such situations, 
groups tend to perfornl poorly in tenl1s of surveying alternatives and objectives and 
appraising uncertainty and risk, leading to poor decision making (McCauley, 1998). 
Hodson and Sorrentino (1997) suggested that uncertainty-oriented groups are less 
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susceptible to these problenls, especially under open-leadership and when a variety 
of opinions are heard. 
Cognitive tnodelling is used in a IlUInber of fields such as system dynanlics, de-
cisioll support systen1s and computer science. It attempts to facilitate enrichnlent 
and validation of hmnan beliefs and perceptions (tuental models) and encourage 
backward and forward thinking. Intuitive decision nuking involves deeply held be-
liefs and assumptions through which reality is constructed (Chen and Lee, 20(3). 
Knowledge in human brains is enlbodied in cognitive structures, referred to as luen-
taltuodels, which are powerful in facilitating learning and quahtative reasoning but 
less efficient at handling large amounts of data, representing cOIllplex phenOIuena, 
or capturing non-linear feedback processes. These models are incomplete and in1-
precisely stated, illlplicit, intuitive, and often wrong. The term 'tuental tuode}' is 
itself ill-defined, being used for a wide variety of mental constructs, but intuitively 
understandable and thus favoured ill a number of scientific disciplines. 
A conlprehensive discussion of the individual and social factors that govern the 
quality of intuitive decision making and perceptions of uncertainty is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, this short review illustrates hmv perceptions 
or beliefs arc translated into weight attached to uncertainty or lack of confidence. 
Furthennore, while it is difficult to assess uncertainty resulting fr0111 these biases and 
heuristics, it is important to acknowledge thenl in policy processes. 
6.3. UNCERTAINTY IN DECISION MODELS 
Choosing one policy Ineasurc from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives i) 
limited by our capacity to process all iluportant factors when tackling large envi-
ronmental prob1cnl~, such as biodiversity conservation, water and soil degradation, 
and clitnate change. In addition to these cognitive limitations, people hold different 
views about what is important and worthy of pursuit. COlnpeting goals and dif-
ferent underlying values attached to outC0111es of policies are yet another source of 
disagreetnent and uncertainty in decision tnaking. 
Decision analysis helps to avoid biases in judgelnent and make decisions more 
compatible \vith nonnative axioms of rationality for situations involving n1ultiple, 
conflicting interests and beliefS. Decision nl0dels (DM,,) result from the systetuatic 
exploration and negotiation of a 'problem,' including its existence, boundaries and 
structure. DMs conlprise alternative courses of actions (policies or pollcy measures); 
decision goals - translated into 1110re tangible evaluation criteria - against vvhich the 
policies are weighed; and preferences, which describe how well the policies satisfY 
the objectives. There are 110nnally several candidate policies; for example, high nl-
trate pollution can be tackled by introducing financial incentives, changing nutrient 
managcluent in farms, protecting littoral vegetation and favouring phytodepura-
tion, or in1proving the effcctiveness of waste water treatnlent plants (WWTP). 
Binary (yes/no) choices, such as whether to adhere to the Kyoto protocol for re-
ducing greenhouse gas elnissio11s are frequently indicative of escalating conflicts 
due to incollul1ensurable ethical principles, values and interests. Goals may refer to 
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cOInpeting targets, e.g. nlacroeCOnonllC developments vs. social inlpact; favouring 
different policies so that no single option outpcrfonns all others. In these situations, 
decision Inakers may be a priori uncertain (undecided) about what policy action 
is most appropriate. This indecisiveness is a result of the diversity of decision out-
conIes, which are not unifonnly distributed in space and time (e.g. different policy 
inlpacts on upstreanl vs. downstreanl water users; WWTP extensions llUY have an 
earlier inlpact on nitrate concentration than land use changes) or the values attached 
to them. Uncertainty in the OlltCOIllCS of a choice poses yet another challenge for 
decision Iluking. 
The tradeoffs or preferences are value judgements, which are frequently not 
observable and rnust be revealed or approximated. Such uncovered preferences are 
context specific and depend on the description and framing of a problem, and 
how the questions are fornmlated. For exaInple, to assess the environnlental costs of 
irrigation, one llmst consider the value of wetlands and riverine ecosystenls deprived 
by water abstraction. These values, regardless of whether they are in lnonetary terms 
or relative utility, may be difficult to approxirnate as the results depend on the 
respondents' prior knowledge, or on what they think others would approve. In 
situations involving uncertainty, preferences are fonned over probabilities of possible 
outcOllles of the policies and integratcd into the decision lllodei. These preferences 
cInbody attitudcs towards risk (risk aversion vs. risk sceking vs. risk neutrality), 
defined according to the value individuals attach to the uncertain outcomes of a 
decision. This mixing of probability and utility is also found in the formulation and 
estimation of statistical models in the physical sciences (Moorthy and Fieller, 1998). 
DMs resenlble scientific sillmlation lllodels (SMs) in tenns of their structure, and 
tendency to abstract and simplifY phenomena deemed important for a particular 
case. For this reason, attelnpts have been !lnde to classifY the types and sources of 
uncertainty that arise in DMs (Ilasson and Petrie, 2007; French, 1995) in a similar 
way to SMs. hnportant sources of uncertainty in a DM include: the extent to which 
decision criteria approxilnate the goals and objectives of a study; redundancy within 
criteria and subsequent overestinntioll of some aspects; coherence and consistency 
of preferences; predictability of policy outconles; representativeness of actors invited 
to deliberate on policy choices; ambiguity of policies/ objectives and expectations 
about their iInplementation. Uncertainties can also be classified by the different 
stages of a decision process, including: boundary negotiation; nl0del development; 
use of models to challenge thinking and interpretation of the results frolll modelling. 
Yet there are important differences between OMs and SMs which limit the practical 
value of such typologies in DMs, as discussed below. 
NUlllerous decision fraIneworks arc available to (more or less explicitly) elicit the 
preferences of individuals and to aggregate them across different objectives (intra-
personal aggregation) and across different actors (inter-personal aggregation). The 
extent to which specific OMs are considered consistent and 'rational' depends on 
the cOlnpliance of the elicited preferences with the Inodel's assumptions and its abil-
ity to outplay cognitive biases. The models differ considerably in terlllS of (i) the 
underlying theory and assumptions (e.g. monetary valuation; utility theory; value 
function approaches; outranking techniques; Bayesian statistics; participatory delib-
eration); (ii) the approach pursued (e.g. generation of tradeoffs versus elicitation 
Environmental Policy Aid Under Uncertainty 93 
of value judgements; a priori methods versus progressive or interactive nlcthods, 
etc.); (iii) the assunled fornl of preference function (e.g. non-additive versus addi-
tive, linear versus non-linear); (iv) the way value judgeInents are elicited (e.g. direct 
assessment versus elicitation of tradeoffs); and (v) the extent to which the Inethod 
acconlmodates different perspectives and problenl structures. 
Although OMs vary in purpose, any given decision problem can typically be 
addressed with Inore than one DM. As such, DMs act as "lenses" through which the 
policy problem is viewed, and different DMs may (frequently do) lead to different 
conclusions. More detailed discussions about the strengths and flaws associated with 
specific DMs can be found in Bell et a1. (2001), French (1995), Kangas and Kangas 
(2004), Mingers and Rosenhead (2004), Poyhonen and Hamalainen (2001) and 
Ryan (1999). 
The process of eliciting preferences can also introduce uncertainty into a DM. 
In this context the description and franling of a problcnl, as well as the formulation 
of specific questions, can influence the preferences elicited, and hence the reliability 
of the results. Prior knowledge, preconceived options, levels of understanding of the 
issues, cOInposition of the interviewed group, levels of inCOIl1e and education and 
the tinle spent considering a problenl all influence the elicited preferences. Thus, 
the 'true' belief, of the individuals may not be elicited, especially if people find 
value judgeluents diffIcult and, in this case, they 11lay adjust their reply to confonu 
with what they believe the interviewer, or the group, fmds luost acceptable (C0111-
pliance biases). As a result, the respondents may ultimately feel manipulated by the 
method or interviewer, and have limited confidence in the results obtained. These 
problems are greatest when (i) the goods or benefits are unique and cannot be 
substituted or replaced, or when it is an important component of the respondents 
endownlent; and (ii) too nlany alternatives/criteria are presented Oia and Fischer, 
1993) or differences in values are high (Bell et aI., 2003; Hobbs and Horn, 1997; 
Hobbs and Meier, 1994). 
The variety of different decision frameworks is problematic, as different 111ethods 
may, and normally do, yield different results and hence the decision may depend on 
the methods selected. Given the large number of methods available, choosing the 
most appropriate one is difficult and, typically, only a small number of well-known 
nlethods arc applied. There is no siluple criterion for preferring one technique 
over another in any given situatioll. Unsurprisingly, luost scientific studies show 
strong partiality for whichever technique confonus best to the world view of the 
policy adviser. The choice of method is frequently influenced by the belief, of those 
identifying policy options, scientists being no exception. The disputes regarding the 
use of alternative approaches are sOll1etinlCS based on prejudices-, lnisconceptions or 
oversilllplifications of the criticised luethods, while intentionally concealing the 
weaknesses of the preferred luethods. In other cases, alternative decision methods 
are ignored, and hence the impacts of selecting a specific nlethod are not considered. 
Clearly, the subjective choices of scientists and decision nukers are an iIl1portant 
component of decision lnaking, but the ilnpacts of methodological diversity, naIuely 
the availability of multiple candidate methods (sometimes referred to as 'equifmality' 
in the physical sciences), has received relatively little attention in decision nuking. 
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In summary, disagreclncnts are inevitable when multiple possible Inethods are 
available to address any given decision problem. To ovcrCOllle this, different meth-
ods could be applied in parallel, thereby identifYing similarities and highlighting 
inconsistencies between llletho(i-;. This could be seen as an educational exercise, 
whereby the decision lluker learns more about their own preferences (Hobbs and 
Horn, 1997). Indeed, according to French (1995), critical self-reflection is at least 
as important as the outcOIlle reached through DM. This approach has also been 
suggested in the physical sciences, where llmltiple possible explanations of physical 
data and processes arc COIlII110n (e.g. Refsgaard et a1., 20(5). Ho\vever, given the 
practical problcIl'ls of cOillparing Inethods (time, resources, expertise), as well as the 
probletns of selecting an appropriate range of 'candidate methods,' further evidence 
is required on the practicality and value of this approach. 
6.4. UNCERTAINTY IN PRACTICAL POLICY MAKING 
At SOrTIe point the scientists involved in the developnlent of enviromncntal 
policies have to convey the uncertainty associated with the most pronlising policy 
options to the decision I1ukers, who are responsible for nuking the final choice, 
and defend it in the public debate. Even if in the process of policy development, the 
uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, there often remains a su bstantiallevel 
of uncertainty with respect to the effectiveness and outcOIlles of the proposed policy. 
In tackling this problem, policy makers often shift the focus from uncertainty to risk. 
A systematic elaboration of 'risk' is beyond the scope of this paper, but also see 
Chapter 5. We will show sonle cases in which scientists and decision makers inter-
acted in the decision-nuking process in uncertain and 'risky' situations. The cases 
are positioned in a general framework about the concept of risk that COlnes from 
the managerial sciences. The developtnent and implementation of a new environ-
Inental policy shows similarities with the developInent and market introduction of 
a new product. The latter has been studied extensively in business administration 
and managerial sciences (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Smith, 1999). 
In Keizer et a!. (2002) a product innovation is labelled risky if: (1) the likeli-
hood of a bad result is large; (2) the ability to influence it within the limits of tim.e 
and resources is snull; (3) its potential consequences are severe. Often risk analysis 
focuses exclusively on either technological, organisational, market or financial fac-
tors. The success of product innovation, however, is detennined by external and 
internal forces in which all these factors interact. The sinlilarities with innovations 
in environnlental policies arc outlined below. 
• Technolob:ry: the policy is based on sufficient scientific insight into the measures 
and the resulting environmental (and other) effects. 
• Market: policy is accepted by the public and other stakeholders (companies, 
NGC)s and govermnental organisations with a specific interest in the policy). 
• Finance: sufficient funds for im_pleInentation of the policy and low likelihood of 
negative effects with high financial consequences. 
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• Operations: good internal organisation and co-operation with external parties in 
the implementation and Inaintenance of the policy. 
In the following cases uncertainties in the domain of science (technology) resulted 
in possible risks in the donuins of market, fmance and operations. These risks 
have been tackled in interaction between scientists and decision Inakers aiming at a 
decrease of the likelihood of unexpected effects; a decrease of the potential damage 
and an increase of the abilities for 'damage controL' 
6.5. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY THROUGH INNOVATIVE POLICY 
INTERVENTIONS 
In the preceding we lan1ented the fact that it was difficult to conlpletely elimi-
nate uncertainty from the process of decision nuking. However good environmental 
outcomes can sOInctiInes result from a reduction of perceived uncertainty below a 
certain qualitative threshold. In other instances a transformation of the nature of un-
certainty in a manner that relieves apparent stressors, imposed by discipline-induced 
cO!:,Tflitive biases Jnd perceptions, can siIllilarly result in a positive outcome. 
A practical example of this COIlles fron1 the Bay-Delta region of Call forni a where 
water exports from the Delta were, suspected as the cause of the anadromous fishery. 
Water exports to coastal citics and agriculture were curtailed at the behest of biol-
ogists based on perceived risk to the fishery, which caused hostility between water 
agencies and the resource agencies responsible for the fishery. Existing policy was 
too cumbersome to develop 111ultiobjective optinul solutions to the problem. In-
novative policy makers created an "enviromnental water account" - a bank account 
of water supply designated for fish and wildlife uses. Biologists could spend the re-
source as they nught l1lOney ill a bank account and were allovved to save a portion 
of that unused one year for the next. When exports were curtailed to municipal, 
industrial and agricultural custOI11ers, water was drawn frOIn the account according 
to the length of time the curtailn1ent occurred and the flow reduction required. 
The net effect was to refralne the issue - creating a ne\v decision space which C011-
strained the options available to fish agencies \vhile providing the water agencies 
with reduced risk of what had been perceived as arbitrary curtaihnents in water 
exports. This exaInple illustrates how changing the mix and weighting of the pre-
viously described risk vectors in decision space - technology, nurket inducements, 
financc and operation - can lead to Inore stable, sustainable and environmcntally 
sound policies. 
Enviromnentally sound and politically innovative policy can someti111CS be 
achieved as a result of a more linear, progressive erosion of uncertainty - where 
this uncertainty is often used for political ends to perpetuate a status quo and in-
duce inertia to change. A good exaIllple of thi5, also fron1 California, ,vas the Mono 
Lake controversy. Declining \vater levels in a high-Sierran terminal lake cJused by 
over-diversion of streanlflow by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
threatened unique tufa fonnatiolls, gull and shorebird communities within the Pa-
cific Flyway and had eliminated several native flsheries. Grassroots activism and 
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development of core science from field data co11ected at the lake eventually showed 
a defensible relationship between lake level and ecosystem health. Activism of the 
policy front cOInbined with the enlerging science brought the issue to the attention 
of the general public and helped to convince legislators to alibTfl against a very pow-
erful "vater agency. Legislation finally passed that forced Los Angeles to manage the 
watershed in an enviromnentally responsible lnanner and give up a portion of their 
acquired water right. This is an exaIllple of a process where the scientific nlethod 
of collecting and interpreting data and developing progressively better ecosysteIn 
models whittles away uncertainty where finally the weight of evidence tips the 
scales against a formidable opponent. Policy call then be crafted, that is congruent 
with the new paradig111 of uncertainty, to optilnally reapportion the i"esource aillong 
cOInpeting uses in l1lUltiobjective decision space. This last process sOInetilnes takes 
tillle as a COIlllllon universe of discourse is developed between foriller adversaries. 
Another exanlple of progressive erosion of uncertainty by interaction between 
scientists and policy llukers conIes frOln The Netherlands. The Dutch Environ-
lnental and Nature Policy AssessInent Agency (MNP) is a centre of expertise for the 
national goverIlIl1ent in the developIllent, Illonitoring and asseSSIllent of policies for 
the quality of environment and nature. Models and databases on various environ-
111ental topics are inlportant instrUlllents in the MNP-toolbox. In a comprehensive 
study Qansen et a!., 2(04), 27 models and databases frequently used by MNP were 
audited. Uncertainty was an inlportant aspect in the audits. The outconles of the 
study created among policy makers a 'willingness to invest' in improvement of the 
MNP-toolbox. This raised the question where to invest, ill order to get an optimal 
contribution to future decision nuking. At this point the focus changed frolll un-
certainty to risk. The nlodels and databases were grouped in categories according 
to the political perception of the risks: 
(1) Low: instruments for the design of generic policies (affecting many interest 
groups) on issues that are generally accepted by the Dutch society. 
(2) MediUlll: instrUlllents for the design of generic policies on issues which are 
controversial in Dutch society (raise a lot of political debate). 
(3) High: instruments for the design of specific policies with a large potential effect 
on the (fmancial) interests of certain stakeholder groups or individuals (farmers, 
conlpanies). 
Based on this risk-analysis the MNP decided to invest substantially in quality 
improvement of the models and databases in category 3 and 2. After this first-order 
selection based 011 risks, a further second-order selection and design of improvement 
111eaSUres was carried out on the basis of the scientific uncertainties in the individual 
IllOdels and databases. 
6.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is apparent that perceptions of uncertainty, scientific or otherwise, depend 
strongly on the context in which they were developed, and that any treatnlent 
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of uncertainty in policy-related research must acknowledge this. If uncertainty is 
viewed as a level of confidence, and thus dependent on the beliefs of individuals 
and groups of people, there is a clear correspondence between a decision nlaker's 
perceived uncertainty and their level of satisfaction, trust and acceptance of the 
resulting decisions. However, establishing confidence (reducing uncertainty) is less 
straightforward, since the main sources of uncertainty arc case-specific and vary 
with the decision problem, levels and access to information, the expertise, interest, 
and personalities of those involved and the Illethods used to elicit preferences. In 
practice, these sources of uncertainty arc difficult to specify precisely and cannot 
be quantified numerically in an operational way. This steIns frOIll the inherent dif-
ficulty of identifying subtle changes in personal relations, perceptions and level of 
trust, all of which arc central to decision nlaking. Thus, while it rnay be possible to 
develop classifications of uncertainty, such as lists of cognitive biases and heuristics, 
it is likely that such atternpts will ilnprove the qualification of uncertainties in spe-
cific cases. This points to an inlportant difference between decision models, whose 
principal ain1 is to establish values and preferences (which are strongly dependent 
on the act of observing) and scientiftc sinudation models, where values and prefer-
ences are secondary, and results are (presumed) only weakly dependent on the act 
of observing. These differences are important in understanding the difficulties of 
cOIllmunication between scientists and decision lnakers on issues of uncertainty. 
Despite these differences, scientiftc lnodels and decision rnodels are conlple-
mentary. The former improve our ability to store and process large volmnes of data 
and analyse complex patterns and non-linear feedbacks, which are beyond our vi-
sual and mental capacity. The latter enhance our ability to Inake coherent choices 
and comply with assmned axioms of rational behaviour. In both cases, there are 
strong links between nlOdel structures and normative frameworks (deftning what is 
rational and desirable), although they arc more apparent in decision lnodelling. It is 
diffIcult, therefore, to cOInpare models without considering the appropriateness of 
their nornldtive assumptions. 
This chapter does !lot include a deeper reflection about the role of episteIno-
logical frameworks in infonning environmental policy Inaking or in pronlpting 
divergent understandings of uncertainty. Indeed, this is partly because the authors 
hold different opinions on the extent to which they hamper progress. However, 
it is clear that particular conceptions of uncertainty are influenced by the wider 
context in which research is conducted, including its social, political and ethical 
fraIlleworks. 
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